近日，北京大学市场经济研究中心研究员石凡奇助理教授与合作者的研究成果《Implementing Optimal Outcomes through Sequential Auctions》在产业组织领域顶级期刊《RAND Journal of Economics》上正式发表。 

　　Abstract：We study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit-demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and the constrained optimal revenue, subject to (BIC), (IIR), and the all-sold constraint. In addition, with increasing threshold types and optimal static reserve prices, any l-th price auctions in the same sequence can achieve the optimal revenue subject to (BIC) and (IIR). Our results have implications for practical auction design, such as sponsored search auctions.