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经济学论坛(5月)通知

2017-05-07   

“经济学论坛”是由北京大学经济学院经济学系主办的专业学术性论坛。论坛致力于打造一个经济学专业人士进行交流与对话的平台,对当前及未来的经济理论、研究方法和现实热点问题展开广泛、深入、全面、开放的探讨。论坛每月举办一次,由主题演讲、专业评论和自由讨论构成。论坛邀经济学各领域素有研究的知名学者或研究取得积极进展的中青年学者发表主题演讲,并围绕相关问题展开讨论。本期论坛信息如下:


题目:Reputation Building of a Nascent Government in Debt Financing - Lessons from the Bond Market in China, 1912-37

报告人:李丹 复旦大学经济系副教授 波士顿大学博士

李丹,复旦大学经济学院副教授,院长助理。研究领域为经济史, 城市和区域经济, 发展经济学。论文发表于《Explorations in Economic History》、Economic History Review》、《Journal of International Money and Finance》、《World Development》、《Review of Development Economics》、《Papers in Regional Science》等。


时  间:2017年5月12日(周五)12点30分至13点50分

地  点:经济学院302会议室

主持人: 管汉晖 副教授

点评人: 赵留彦 副教授


摘要:

This paper documents the development of the government bond market in Pre-War China (1912-1937). Interestingly, the secondary market for government bonds thrived in terms of its size and liquidity during the early Nationalist Era (1927-31) and declined later. Why did investors finance a nascent military government plagued by warfare? We find that the Nationalist government settled its predecessors’ debts and consistently serviced its debts even it was still in a war to unify China. By doing so, the government successfully distinguished itself from its predecessors, which were serial defaulters, at the first place. Accordingly, the government was able to float more bonds on the secondary market. When the government partially defaulted on its debts later, investors declined its access to the market. Moreover, we construct various quantitative measures for the level of various governments’ reputation throughout our study period. And our empirical analyses show that the government reputation is crucial in affecting the likelihood to float a bond on the secondary market and in determining the prices of the outstanding bonds traded in the market. We suggest that our results are consistent with the implications from the reputational theory on sovereign debts, and show other competing explanations do not fit the observed empirical pattern. Our study sheds light on the puzzling facts that why some nascent governments with undemocratic political institution and weak investor protection can still borrow from the public.



北京大学经济学院经济学系

2016年5月7日

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