北大经院工作坊第1098场
The Effects of Business School Education on Manager Career Outcomes
经济史工作坊
主讲人：Michela Giorcelli（加州大学洛杉矶分校经济系副教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）赵一泠
（清华大学）徐志浩
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色、李波
时间：2025年5月15日（周四）12：30-14：00
形式：腾讯会议
会议号：343-120-155
主讲人简介：
Michela Giorcelli is an Associate Professor of Economics at UCLA. She is also a Faculty Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a research affiliate at CEPR, CESifo, IZA, J-PAL, and CCPR. Her research focuses on economic history and applied microeconomics, with a particular interest in the managerial and technological drivers of long-run productivity and innovation. Her work has been published in leading academic journals, including American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Economic Journal, Journal of Economic History, and Journal of Economic Growth. She received the Kiel Excellence Award in Global Economic Affairs (2020), the Gerschenkron Prize (2017), and the Kauffman Foundation Fellowship Award (2016).
摘要：
I study the effects of business school education on managers’ short- and long-term career outcomes. I use evidence from the Engineering, Science, and Management War Training (ESMWT), which offered MBA-style education to middle managers and production supervisors working at U.S. war industrial facilities during WWII. Employing a regression discontinuity design (RD), I show that managers who scored right above the ESWMT entry exam threshold had a substantially higher probability of being promoted to both middle and top management positions during their entire career, and engaged systematically more in self-employment and innovative entrepreneurial activities than similar managers who scored right below. These effects were stronger for nonwhite and female managers. In terms of mechanisms, the increased promotions followed sizable improvements in facility performance, consistent with the idea that the program content mattered, more than with a signaling hypothesis. Finally, exposure to a network of classmates from better performing firms resulted in higher chances of moving into peer companies and founding a business with them.
北大经院工作坊第1099场
(Sub)optimality and Remedies of the Majority Rule in Team Contests: Theory and Experiments
数字经济工作坊
主讲人：邝仲弘（中国人民大学经济学院副教授）
主持老师：（北大经院）曹光宇
时间：2025年5月16日（周五） 10:00-11:30
地点：北京大学经济学院606会议室
主讲人简介：
Zhonghong is a tenured associate professor in the Department of Digital Economy, School of Economics, Renmin University of China. He received his BEng in computer science (2011-2015) and PhD in management science (2015-2020) from Tsinghua University. His research focuses on microeconomic theory and industrial organization and has appeared in JET and GEB. His undergraduate students have been admitted by top econ programs in US such as Yale, Columbia, etc. He also worked for several domestic academic organizations and China National Committee for Graduate Education of Digital Economy.
摘要：
This paper studies effort-maximizing prize designs in team contests with pairwise battles and homogeneous players within teams. The organizer rewards teams contingent on battle outcomes subject to budget balance constraints. We find that the majority rule is suboptimal when two teams are sufficiently asymmetric, but adding another design instrument can restore optimality. If the prize allocation rule must be identity-independent, the instrument is a tie margin; if the rule can be identity-dependent, the instrument is a head start for the weak team. The proportional rule is always suboptimal, but it can increase the total effort when two teams are sufficiently asymmetric. To test these theoretical predictions, we conducted a laboratory experiment, the results of which largely support these predictions.
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：闻听
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
