近日，北京大学市场经济研究中心研究员吴泽南副教授与合作者的研究成果《Optimally biased Tullock contests》在国际期刊《Journal of Mathematical Economics》2021年1月刊正式发表。

　　Abstract: This paper examines optimally biased Tullock contests. We consider a multi-player Tullock contest in which players differ in their prize valuations. The designer is allowed to impose identity-dependent treatments—i.e., multiplicative biases—to vary their relative competitiveness. The literature has been limited, because a closed-form solution to the equilibrium is in general unavailable when the number of contestants exceeds two, which nullifies the usual implicit programming approach. We develop an algorithmic technique adapted from the general approach of Fu and Wu (2020) and obtain a closed-form solution to the optimum that addresses a broad array of design objectives. We further analyze a resource allocation problem in a research tournament and adapt (Fu and Wu, 2020) approach to this noncanonical setting. Our analysis paves the way for future research in this vein.