近日，北京大学市场经济研究中心研究员吴泽南长聘副教授与合作者的研究成果《Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Contests》在博弈论领域著名期刊《Games and Economic Behavior》上正式发表。

　　Abstract：This paper studies a multi-player lottery contest in which heterogeneous contestants exhibit reference-dependent loss aversion à la Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007. We verify the existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy choice-acclimating personal Nash equilibrium (CPNE) under moderate loss aversion and fully characterize the equilibrium. The equilibrium sharply contrasts with that in the two-player risk-neutral symmetric case. Loss aversion can lead contestants' individual efforts to change nonmonotonically, while the total effort strictly decreases. Further, it always leads to a more elitist distributional outcome, in the sense that a smaller set of contestants remain active in the competition and stronger contestants' equilibrium winning probabilities increase. We demonstrate that loss aversion generates a fundamentally different decision problem than risk aversion and develop a rationale that explains the contrasting predictions from the two frameworks. Finally, our results are robust under the alternative equilibrium concept of preferred personal Nash equilibrium (PPNE).