近日，北京大学市场经济研究中心特聘研究员吴泽南长聘副教授与合作者的研究成果《Bid Caps in Noisy Contests》在国际期刊《American Economic Journal: Microeconomics》上正式发表。

Abstract：This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players’ bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez-faire policy—i.e., no cap—is optimal when the designer maximizes the aggregate bid. The results also generate novel practical implications.