时 间：2019年10月17日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院301会议室
主讲人：Itzhak Gilboa
题 目：理性与贝叶斯范式 Rationality and the Bayesian Paradigm
摘 要：It is argued that, contrary to a rather prevalent view within economic theory, rationality does not imply Bayesianism. The talk begins by defining these terms, in particular the less standard definitions of objective and subjective rationality, and justifying the choice of these definitions. We will then discuss the main justification for this prevalent view, analyze it and expose some of its weaknesses, and discuss alternative views.
主讲人介绍：
Itzhak Gilboa’s research focuses on decision under uncertainty, and has worked extensively with David Schmeidler on axiomatic foundation of non-Bayesian decision theory. He has also contributed to complexity in game theory, evolutionary game theory, and social choice. He has published numerous articles and six books, of which three are textbooks in decision theory: “Theory of Decision under Uncertainty”, two textbooks “Rational Choice”, and “Making Better Decisions”. Gilboa holds the AXA Chair of Decision Sciences at HEC, Paris, the Chair of Economic Theory and Decision Theory at Tel-Aviv University. He served in various editorial positions, including a co-editorship of Econometrica, and was elected an International Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Your participation is warmly welcomed!
