【讲座题目】Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium "建立K阶理性和纳什均衡之桥梁
【摘要】
In this project, we propose a new solution concept NLK, that aims to augment two existing concepts in game theory, Nash Equilibrium (NE) and Level-K model. Of these two, NE is contradicted by mounting and robust evidence for not predicting behaviors well in laboratory experiments. As opposed to NE, Level-K model explicitly allows players to assume their opponents are less sophisticated than themselves. However, it does not allow players to use an important element of strategic thinking, namely “put yourself in the others’ shoes” and believe the opponent can think in the same way they do. Bridging NE and Level-K, NLK allows a player in a game to believe that the opponent may be either less- or as sophisticated as they—a view supported by various studies in psychology. We compare the performance of NLK to that of NE and some versions of Level-K by applying it to data from three experimental papers published in top economics journals and to data from a field study. These studies allow us to test NLK on: (1). A static game of complete information, (2). A static game of incomplete information, (3). A dynamic game of perfect information, and (4). On field data. NLK provides additional insights to those of NE and Level-K. Moreover, a simple version of it explains the experimental data better in many cases. As a new solution concept, NLK shares a similar foundation to NE but is also applicable to games with players of different cognitive or reasoning abilities. As an analytical tool, NLK exists and gives a sharp prediction in general, and therefore it can be applied to empirical analysis in a broad range of settings.
【主讲人】张露瑶 博士
【主持人】张博 教授
【时间】11月13日（周二）10:30—12:00
【地点】经济学院305会议室
【主讲人简介】Luyao Zhang is a Ph.D. Candidate holding Presidential Fellowship at the Ohio State University, supported by the National Science Foundation Dissertation Grant. She has been striving to be a microeconomist with a broad theoretical and empirical overview, particularly, but not restricted to, decision theory, game theory, mechanism design, industrial organization, and experimental economics. She has an abiding passion for formal modelling of bounded rationality and its applications. She is also keenly interested in transdisciplinary collaborations.
热烈欢迎各位师生莅临讲座，参与研讨！
