北大经院工作坊第305场
专利代理与专利质量
国际经济学与实证产业组织工作坊
主讲人：
李锴（厦门大学经济学院王亚南经济研究院助理教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）莫家伟
参与老师：
（北大经院）杨汝岱、田巍、刘政文
（北大新结构）王歆、徐铭梽
时间：
2021年6月15日（周二）
10：00-11：30
地点：
经济学院305会议室
主讲人简介：
李锴，厦门大学经济学院王亚南经济研究院助理教授。研究领域为产业组织、创新与竞争、国际贸易，论文发表于JEBO等学术期刊，并有多篇论文投稿和再审中。
摘要：
Patent agencies serve as important intermediaries in the market for innovation, where patent applications require professional knowledge in drafting and filing. On the one hand, patent agencies increase approval probability by improving patent quality. On the other hand, patent agencies may also merely increase the approval probability of patent application without quality improvement. In our study, we build a simple model to illustrate the two roles of patent agencies and exploit the change of the patent law to separate the two effects. We find evidence that in support with both effects of patent agencies.
北大经院工作坊第306场
总额控制结合按病种分值付费制度对医院的再分配效应
劳动-健康经济学工作坊
主讲人：
易君健（香港中文大学经济系副教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）袁野
（北大国发院）张丹丹
参与老师：
（北大经院）秦雪征、王耀璟、石菊
（北大国发院）赵耀辉、李玲、刘国恩、雷晓燕
时间：
2021年6月16日（周三）
10：00-11：30
形式：
腾讯会议链接：
https://meeting.tencent.com/s/yapFaH8y3U89
会议 ID：503 327 013
会议密码：12321
主讲人简介：
易君健，男，1978年出生于湖南省湘乡市。2011年获得香港中文大学博士学位。2011年至2014年赴美国芝加哥大学经济系从事博士后研究，师从James Heckman（2000年诺贝尔经济学奖得主）和Gary Becker（1992年诺贝尔经济学奖得主）。2014年至2020年担任新加坡国立大学经济系助理教授。2021年至今担任香港中文大学经济系副教授。目前的研究兴趣主要集中于医疗与健康经济学、医疗与健康大数据分析、人工智能经济学、人力资本理论、劳动和人口经济学、发展经济学、计量经济学和行为经济学，先后在经济学、管理学、公共卫生与人口学等领域内的国际顶级学术期刊发表科研论文，包括Demography, Management Science, Review of Economics and Statistics, Economic Journal, International Economic Review, The Lancet, Journal of Labor Economics, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Development Economics等。
摘要：
This paper examines the distributional consequences of the diagnosis-based payment scheme with a global budget for hospitals. We explore a payment reform in the urban employee basic medical insurance system in China in 2016. In response to the payment reform from fee-for-service to diagnosis-based payment scheme with a global budget, hospitals raise revenue through multiple channels: Hospitals upcode admission cases within each diagnostic category, increase the shares of patients in categories with higher upcoding potential, and increase the total number of admissions. Under the global budget cap, hospitals’ heterogenous responses to the payment reform lead to increasing disparity in hospital payments and hospital revenue. Our decomposition analysis suggests that such increasing disparity is mainly driven by the heterogeneous upcoding behaviors across hospitals. Hospitals that are more experienced in diagnostic categories with higher upcoding potential, larger in size, and more exposed to the reform upcode cases more aggressively.
北大经院工作坊第307场
Too Old To Fail: Risk Perception and Market Discipline
风险、保险与不确定性经济学工作坊
主讲人：
Shinichi Kamiya （新加坡南洋理工大学副教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）贾若
（清华经管）刘晨源
（人大财金）陈泽
参与老师：
（北大经院）郑伟
（清华经管）陈秉正
（人大财金）魏丽
时间：
2021年6月16日（周三）
13：00-14：30
形式：
线下：文史楼207（演讲人在线上）
线上：ZOOM会议
链接：zoom.us/j/5921781573
会议 ID：5921781573
会议密码：02864
主讲人简介：
Dr. Shinichi Kamiya is currently an associate professor in the Division of Banking and Finance at Nanyang Business School (NBS) at Nanyang Technological University. Dr. Kamiya received his Ph.D. degree in Risk and Insurance from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2010 and his Master degree in Applied Mathematics from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2003. Before starting his Ph.D study, Dr. Kamiya taught actuarial courses including Probability and Loss Model at Keio University and Tohoku University in Japan. His research papers appear in Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Risk and Insurance, North American Actuarial Journal, and Insurance: Mathematics and Economics. His current research topics include reputation, catastrophe risk management, and corporate risk management.
摘要：
This paper studies the impact of lenders’ risk belief sensitivity to a change in company risk and public insolvency guarantees, on market discipline in life insurance during the 1985-2010 period. We find strong market discipline for young insurers but not for older insurer, supporting the strong influence of lenders’ risk belief insensitivity to risk due their trust attached to individual insurers. Furthermore, by exploiting the variation in the creation of guaranty funds by 16 states during the sample period, we find robust evidence that the market discipline in young insurers has been dampened by guaranty funds, while such moral hazard is not observed in old insurers. We also find some evidence to suggest that company risk increases with lender trust through but little evidence of the influence of guaranty fund coverage on risk-taking in the US life insurance industry.
北大经院工作坊第308场
自然壁垒与政策壁垒
国际经济学与实证产业组织工作坊
主讲人：
焦阳（复旦大学泛海国际金融学院经济学助理教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）刘政文
参与老师：
（北大经院）杨汝岱、田巍、刘冲、莫家伟
（北大新结构）王歆、徐铭梽
时间：
2021年6月17日（周四）
10：00-11：30
地点：
经济学院305会议室
主讲人简介：
焦阳，复旦大学泛海国际金融学院经济学助理教授。 焦阳教授于2018年获哥伦比亚大学经济学博士学位，他曾于达特茅斯学院做博士后，并曾在亚洲开发银行和美联储圣路易斯分行做论文实习生。他的主要研究领域为国际宏观和贸易，具体研究兴趣包括发展中国家债务和贸易的货币选择，贸易与政治经济学的关系等。
摘要：
This paper investigates whether “natural” trade barriers of a country due to geography and other factors outside the country’s control stimulate more or less policy barriers such as tariffs. Our theory predicts that the politician’s relative weight on private benefits over social welfare in a “protection-for-sale” setup depends on these “natural” features. The key mechanism is that a society’s willingness to invest in improving institutions that constrain rent-seeking behavior is influenced by the natural barriers. Two types of empirical evidence support the theoretical predictions. First, we show that “natural” barriers beget policy barriers - countries with more “natural” barriers tend to have higher tariffs and more NTBs. Second, we show that liberalization begets liberalization - in response to unilateral trade reforms in China in the early 2000s, those other countries whose geography and comparative advantage allow them to benefit more from the Chinese liberalization also undertake more liberalization of their own in a way that is consistent with the theory.
