北大经院工作坊第332场
试点中的按病种付费——DRG与DIP的异同比较
劳动-健康经济学工作坊
主讲人：
简伟研（北京大学公共卫生学院研究员）
主持老师：
（北大经院）石菊
（北大国发院）雷晓燕
参与老师：
（北大经院）秦雪征、王耀璟、袁野
（北大国发院）赵耀辉、李玲、刘国恩、张丹丹
时间：
2021年10月13日（周三） 10：00-11：30
形式：
腾讯会议线上平台（若有意参会，请发送姓名、学院至manqihou@pku.edu.cn以获取会议链接，仅限北大师生）
主讲人简介：
简伟研，博士，北京大学公共卫生学院研究员，卫生政策与管理系副主任。主要研究方向：医保支付制度、卫生系统评价、医疗质量管理。
摘要：
近年来，国家积极试点把按项目付费变革为按病种付费，“按疾病诊断相关组DRG）付费”以及“区域点数法总额预算和按病种分值付费（DIP）”是目前国家医保局同步推进的两种模式。今年开始，无论是DRG的试点城市还是DIP的试点城市，都将陆续进入实际付费阶段。DRG和DIP的基本定价单元均为“病种”，都采用相对权重反映比价关系，分组的基础均为国际疾病分类（ICD）编码，然而，在分类理念、操作方法、运行方式上却又有显著的差异。比较这两种医保付费模式在分组过程、使用的数据变量、具体支付政策设计以及实际应用过程中的异同，有助于从本质上把握这两种模式的特征，无论对于DRG、DIP自身的发展完善还是对于各地因地制宜选择医保支付方式都有裨益。在试点阶段对政策经验进行及时总结，对于未来大范围的医保支付制度改革也能提供经验和证据参考。
北大经院工作坊第333场
Farsighted Preference, Intention-Behavior Gap and Self-regulation
微观理论经济学工作坊
主讲人：
申萌（首都经济贸易大学经济学院副教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛
（北大国发院）汪浩
（北大光华）翁翕、刘烁
时间：
2021年10月13日（周三） 10：30-12：00
地点：
经济学院 305会议室
主讲人简介：
申萌博士，毕业于北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院，美国哥伦比亚大学经济学院联合培养博士。目前为首都经济贸易大学经济学院副教授，博士生导师。研究兴趣主要集中在居民绿色行为和政府环境政策。
摘要：
Departure from the conventional wisdom, this paper shows that people treat sustainability as priority may not lead to sustainable behavior but intention-behavior gap. Axiomatic characterizations are proposed for a far-sighted preference, in which the agent does not discount distant future reward from sustainability but discount future consumption as usual. A far-sighted agent intends to let the future-selves take more responsibilities because their consumption cost is less important due to discounting. However, their behavior is automatically triggered by situational cues and thus highly routinized. Self-regulation is like an uphill road and become a Sisyphean task if the road is too long. Furthermore, the existence and disappearance of greenium is discussed as an example.
北大经院工作坊第334场
A Theory of Aristocracy
经济史工作坊
主讲人：
SNG Tuan Hwee (孙传炜， 新加坡国立大学副教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）赵一泠
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色
（北大国发院）席天扬、于航
时间：
2021年10月12日（周二）20：00-21：30
形式：
线上ZOOM Meeting
ID：892 9403 0759
Passcode：835209
主讲人简介：
SNG Tuan Hwee (孙传炜) is presently Associate Professor of Economics at National University of Singapore (2012–). He is interested in economic history and political economy and specializes in comparative institutional analysis, with a focus on China and Japan. Tuan Hwee earned his PhD from Northwestern University. He was post-doctoral fellow at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance, Princeton University in 2011–12 and fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University in 2020–21.
摘要：
We study the use of patrimonial aristocrats as administrators in historical societies and their eventual replacement by an impersonal, meritocratic bureaucracy. We build a theoretical framework to show that in a world with poor technology to centralize fiscal resources, it is advantageous for a regime to employ patrimonial appointees who have a stake in the regime as administrators. Transport improvements that facilitates fiscal centralization and the advent of effective technologies to nurture and spot talent will increase the appointment of non-aristocrats in administration. Larger empires will have a stronger motivation to promote bureaucratization due to the difficulties of maintaining a large, tight-knit aristocratic class. We use the framework to explain the relationship between bureaucratization and centralization, the spatial arrangement of domains and fiefs, China's precocity in developing an administrative meritocracy, and variations in the transition from aristocracy to bureaucracy in other societies, including Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.
