北大经院工作坊第727场
Increasing Health Insurance Take-Up in the United States using Personalized Assistance
经院-全健院
“健康与劳动经济学”工作坊
主讲人：Rebecca Myerson（University of Wisconsin’s School of Medicine and Public Health）
主持老师：（北大全健院）吕蓓妮
参与老师：
（北大全健院）刘国恩、潘聿航、林昊翔、孙宇、杨佳楠
（北大经院）秦雪征、石菊、姚奕、王耀璟、袁野、梁远宁、庄晨
时间：2023年10月18日（周三）10：00-11：30
形式：ZOOM会议
会议号：275 603 6616
会议密码：无
主讲人简介：
Rebecca Myerson is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Population Health Sciences at the University of Wisconsin’s School of Medicine and Public Health. Her research examines the impacts of public policies and information interventions on take-up of insurance coverage, health care access, and health outcomes. Myerson holds a doctorate in public policy from the University of Chicago, a master in public health from the University of Washington, and a bachelor degree from Harvard. Myerson’s policy research has been honored with the ISPOR Award for Excellence in Application of Pharmacoeconomics and Health Outcomes Research and cited by the New York Times, Washington Post, United States Senate Committee on Finance, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
摘要：
Health care expenditures account for more than 18% of the United States GDP, and health insurance plays an important role in reducing the costs of care for patients and shielding patients from medical bankruptcy. Yet, many Americans struggle with health insurance enrollment or renewal processes and remain uninsured despite eligibility for low-cost or free insurance. My work evaluates personalized, scalable outreach methods aimed at promoting equal access to health insurance. The underlying hypothesis is that one-on-one multilingual assistance can address multiple barriers to coverage including administrative hassles, low health insurance literacy, and low English proficiency. First, I present evidence on the impact of Affordable Care Act navigator programs on health insurance coverage, using the 80% cut in program funding under the Trump administration as a natural experiment. This research was cited by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in their decision not to allow Georgia to eliminate the navigator program. Two field experiments, one completed and one in the field, assess the impact of outbound telephone calls on enrollment in the health insurance marketplace and renewal of Medicaid coverage, a safety net health insurance program. The strategies we test in these field experiments could be readily scaled in other states or nationwide to reduce gaps in health insurance coverage.
北大经院工作坊第728场
The Soft Environmental Budget Constraint: Unintended Effects of China's SOE Reform on Environmental Regulation
发展与公共财政工作坊
主讲人：黄清扬（北京大学国家发展研究院、南南合作与发展学院助理教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇
（北大国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健
时间：2023年10月18日（周三）11：30-13：00
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园131教室
主讲人简介：黄清扬，北京大学国家发展研究院、南南合作与发展学院助理教授。他于2023年从加州大学伯克利分校获得博士学位，主要研究领域是发展经济学、环境经济学和政治经济学。
摘要：
In China, central and provincial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were historically exempt from local environmental regulations due to institutional barriers. This exemption prompted local authorities to impose stricter environmental regulations on private entities to achieve their emission reduction targets. We explore the effects of the unintended resolution of this soft environmental budget constraint following the decentralization of polluting central and provincial SOEs during China's SOE reform. Using detailed firm-level panel data, we find that polluting SOEs, when decentralized to the prefectural level, encountered stricter environmental regulations. This led to diminished emissions, a drop in total factor productivity (TFP), and increased inputs in pollution control rather than production. Conversely, private firms in the same region displayed a rise in emissions, output, and TFP. The spillover effects were especially marked for private firms with significant financial limitations. On a broader scale, SOE decentralization in a given prefecture led to an overall reduction in emissions without notably impacting aggregate industrial output or productivity. A hypothetical reallocation of 10% emissions from SOEs to private firms could yield total industrial output gains ranging from 0.74% to 3.31%.
北大经院工作坊第729场
On Competition in Linear Persuasion Games
微观理论经济学工作坊
主讲人：孙君泽（武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）汪浩、胡岠、邢亦青
（北大光华）翁翕、刘烁
时间：2023年10月19日（周四）10：30-12：00
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园329教室
主讲人简介：
Junze Sun is an associate research fellow (untenured associate professor) at the School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD in economics from the University of Amsterdam in 2019. Before joining Wuhan University, he worked as a Max Weber postdoctoral research fellow at the European University Institute. His research interests lie in microeconomic theory, information economics, political economics, as well as behavioral and experimental economics. His current research mainly focuses on two themes: strategic provision and effects of information in elections, and strategic information transmission in sender-receiver games. His papers have been accepted for publication or requested for revision at various journals, including Games and Economics Behavior, Journal of Public Economic Theory, and the Economic Journal.
摘要：
We study competition in persuasion with multiple senders in linear Bayesian persuasion games, where senders' payoffs depend only on the receiver's posterior expectation about a uni-dimensional state. Using the duality method for linear persuasion (Dworczak and Martini, 2019), we derive a partial geometric characterization for the minimally informative equilibrium outcomes. Building on this, we identify a sufficient and necessary condition that ensures full information disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We apply this condition to a game in which multiple senders compete in persuading a privately informed receiver to take a binary action. There, we show that a strong conflict of interests between senders is neither sufficient nor necessary to robustly – i.e., independently of the distributions of the state and the receiver's private type – induce full disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We provide economically meaningful sufficient conditions for such robust full disclosure. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions that ensure a receiver to be strictly better off by exploiting senders' competition instead of consulting any single sender.
北大经院工作坊第730场
The Economics of Mobilizing Free-riders: Evidence from the Chinese Civil War 1945-1949
经济史工作坊
主讲人：Peiyuan Li (Duke Kunshan University)
主持老师：（北大经院）赵一泠、Mark Hup
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色
（北大国发院）席天扬、于航
时间：2023年10月19日（周四）16：00-17：30
地点：北京大学经济学院302会议室
主讲人简介：
Peiyuan Li is an assistant professor at Duke Kunshan University. His research focus is at the crossroads of economic history, political economy and development economics. His research has been published in Australian Economic History Review and Economics of Transition and Institutional Change. He won the Best Paper Award at the Annual International Symposium on Quantitative History in 2021.
摘要：
Land redistribution can be deliberately designed to trigger a civil war. How did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rally millions of farmers to win in 1949? The crucial step was to initiate land reform through class struggle, empowering farmers to violently take land from their landlords. Farmers desired land ownership but feared reprisals from landlords, who were backed by the Kuomintang (KMT) government. Therefore, farmers had to choose between joining the CCP’s army to defend their land, and free-riding. Adopting a difference-in-difference design and examining the death records of 566,161 Communist soldiers, I find that, for counties within 82 kilometers of KMT forces, a greater share of land redistribution to farmers encouraged farmers to fight, leading to a rise in CCP soldier deaths after land reform. However, for counties that were farther than 82 kilometers from KMT forces, a greater share of land transfer to farmers discouraged them from fighting (free-riding), resulting in fewer soldier deaths after land reform. A model of class struggle for land ownership explains the two different patterns. This paper develops a novel theory of war mobilization.
北大经院工作坊第731场
Rolled-over Credit Cycles
(展期信用周期)
宏观经济学工作坊
主讲人：汤皓州（东北财经大学高等经济研究院助理教授）
主持老师：（北大经院）李博
参与老师：
（北大国发院）赵波、余昌华、李明浩
（北大经院）陈仪、韩晗、李伦
时间：2023年10月20日（周五）10：00-11：30
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园246教室
主讲人简介：
Dr. Haozhou TANG is currently an assistant professor at Institute for Advanced Economic Research (IAER), Dongbei University of Finance and Economics. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Universitat Pompeu Fabra in 2017. Prior to joining IAER, he was an economist in Bank of Mexico. His research focuses on macroeconomic theory, financial markets and firm dynamics. His research has been published in the Journal of Monetary Economics.
摘要：
Canonical macroeconomic and financial models require credit to be equal to its fundamental component, i.e., the net present value of the net flows to creditors. According to this conventional view, credit booms are expected to precede increased flows to creditors. However, data suggests the opposite. To rationalize the novel empirical findings, we develop a model with financial frictions and heterogeneous firms, allowing firms to roll over a fraction of credits indefinitely. We show that an increase in indefinite rollover credit raises the aggregate credit and output while depressing the credit's fundamental component through firms' precautionary savings.
北大经院工作坊第732场
Defending Against Air Pollution: The Role of Active Information Nudge and Attention
(积极的信息助推与关注在空气污染防护中的作用)
生态、环境与气候变化经济学工作坊
主讲人：龚亚珍（中国人民大学环境学院教授）
主持老师：（北大经院）季曦
时间：2023年10月20日（周五）10：00-12：00
地点：北京大学经济学院101会议室
主讲人简介：
龚亚珍博士，教授、博士生导师，中国人民大学环境学院国际交流办公室主任。2023年当选为The Asian Association of Environmental and Resource Economics (AAERE)副理事长。研究兴趣主要集中在两方面：其一，从行为经济学的视角、结合实地实验和问卷调查方法，研究自然资源保护和污染防护中的个体行为决策，并从社会偏好、认知约束等方面探究个体行为决策的影响机理；其二，着重在环境和健康、气候变化影响与适应、环境规制等方向上开展微观计量分析。研究成果发表在PNAS，Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Land Economics, Ecological Economics，Annual Review of Resource Economics，Agricultural Economics，Climatic Change、Science of the Total Environment等SSCI/SCI期刊，以及《中国环境科学》《自然资源学报》等国内核心期刊。主持了“十四五”国家重点研发计划项目课题、“十三五”国家重点研发计划项目子课题、国家自然科学基金面上项目及国家自然科学基金青年基金项目等。
摘要：
Information nudges have been widely used to influence behavior but there is a lack of understanding of the associated mechanisms and the optimal design. We distinguish active and passive information nudges and show that the former is more effective in promoting defensive behaviors such as outdoor time and mask-wearing against air pollution, and does so through reducing inattention. We conduct a large-scale field experiment through randomized control trails in Northern China with treatments of free masks and information nudges throughout a winter heating season when pollution was the heaviest. Unlike passive information nudges where participants were simply provided information about pollution and the associated health damages and required defensive measures, active nudges require participants to perform an easy task such as matching pollution levels with the corresponding health damages as well as the necessity to wear facemasks.
第166次北大赛瑟（CCISSR）双周讨论会
中国养老金业务及其评价
主讲人：闫化海（北京济安金信科技有限公司养老金研究中心主任）
主持人：朱南军（北京大学经济学院教授）
时间：2023年10月20日（周五）10：00-11：30
线下地点：北京大学经济学院302会议室
线上形式：腾讯会议
会议号：682 645 207
会议密码：1020
摘要：
一、介绍我国养老金三支柱体系中各类养老金业务的实际投资运作情况，二、分析二三支柱中的各类养老金融产品（含个人养老金产品）的发展现状及其不足，三、介绍业内对养老金管理机构、养老金产品、投资经理的评价工作发展情况。
主讲人简介：
闫化海，管理学博士，金融学博士后，中国人民大学金融信息中心副主任、济安金信养老金研究中心主任。2007年起开始养老金业务管理工作，先后任职于平安养老、易方达基金、泰康养老、建信养老，从事养老金业务受托人、投管人和账管人实际管理工作，先后服务80余家央企和100多家大型企业（主要是地方国企）的企业年金管理工作，参与多省市职业年金管理工作，熟知养老金实际管理工作，对养老金业务有深刻的理解和认知。
主办单位：
北京大学中国保险与社会保障研究中心
北京大学经济学院风险管理与保险学系
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：兮哲
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
