主讲人：吴泽南（北京大学经济学院长聘副教授）
参与老师：
（北大经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇、年永威
（北大国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健、黄清扬
（北大光华管理学院）张晓波、仇心诚
时间：2024年10月30日（周三）10:30-12:00
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园245教室
主讲人简介：
吴泽南，北京大学经济学院长聘副教授。清华大学经济学学士，宾夕法尼亚大学经济学博士。研究领域为应用微观理论，主要集中在竞赛理论、保险市场、产业组织理论与行为经济学。近年在Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, RAND Journal of Economics, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Public Economics, Information Systems Research, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 《经济研究》等国内外顶级期刊上发表论文十余篇。
摘要：
We argue that inter-jurisdictional competition in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime distorts local politicians’ incentives in resource allocation among firms from their own city and a competing city. We develop a tournament model of project selection that captures the driving forces of local protectionism. The model robustly predicts that the joint presence of regional spillover and the incentive for political competition leads to biased resource allocations against the competing regions. Combining several unique data sets, we test our model predictions in the context of government procurement allocation and firms' equity investment across Chinese cities. We find that, first, when local politicians are in more intensive political competition, they allocate less government procurement contracts to firms in the competing city; second, local firms, especially local SOEs, internalize the local politicians’ career concerns and invest less in the competing cities. Our paper provides a political economy explanation for inefficient local protectionism in an autocracy incentivized by tournament-style political competition.
供稿单位：科研与博士后办公室
供稿人：刘冲 郑毅帆
