北大经院工作坊第1123场
Keju in the Tang Dynasty: Quantifying the Rise of Meritocracy
经济史工作坊
主讲人：Erik H. Wang（New York University）
主持老师：
（北大经院）赵一泠
（清华大学）徐志浩
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色、李波
时间：2025年6月4日（周三）16:00-18:00
地点：北京大学经济学院305会议室
主讲人简介：
Erik H. Wang is an Assistant Professor in the Wilf Family Department of Politics at New York University (NYU). He obtained his PhD in Politics from Princeton University. He was previously an Assistant Professor at the Australian National University (ANU) and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST). His research interests center on historical political economy, politics of state-building, and bureaucracy. He has also done works on statistical methods of causal inference. His research has appeared in American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Comparative Political Studies, Research and Politics, Journal of Chinese Governance, among others. In 2022, he received the Mancur Olson Award for the Best Dissertation in Political Economy completed in the past two years given by the American Political Science Association (APSA). He has recently co-published the book The Political Economy of China's Imperial Examination System with Cambridge University Press, and the talk will draw on sections of that book.
北大经院工作坊第1124场
Indoctrination in the Classroom: Evidence from the Spanish Social Service
经济史工作坊
主讲人：Alejandro Martínez Marquina（University of Southern California）
主持老师：
（北大经院）赵一泠
（清华大学）徐志浩
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色、李波
时间：2025年6月5日（周四）12:00-13:30
地点：北京大学经济学院219会议室
主讲人简介：
Alejandro Martínez Marquina is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern California Marshall School of Business. His main research fields are Behavioral and Experimental Economics, where he studies difficulties in making good decisions, especially when debt or uncertainty is present. He also has projects in Economic History and Applied Microeconomics, looking at the impact of sudden wealth shocks and how historical events impact traditional gender roles. Before joining the University of Southern California, he was a Klarman Fellow at Cornell University for one year. His papers have been published on the American Economic Review.
摘要：
In 1939, the Spanish dictatorship created the Social Service, a 6-month education program aimed at relegating women to the roles of mothers and housewives. We exploit the discontinuity induced by the sudden abolition of the Social Service and variation in the age of enrollment to examine the consequences of attending the program. Using historical enrollment records and birth and marriage certificates, we find that the Social Service successfully instilled the regime's ideology. Women exposed to the class got married and had kids at younger ages, consistent with the desire to form a family sooner. In addition, they are 10% more likely to become housewives if they have children. Consistent with a mechanism of increased religiosity and conservative values, attendees are less likely to have non-catholic weddings and more likely to be affiliated with the conservative party.
北大经院工作坊第1125场
Spatial Productivity Differences and Government Rent-Seeking
国际经济学与实证产业组织工作坊
主讲人：Sitian Liu（Queen’s University）
主持老师：（北大经院）莫家伟
参与老师：
（北大经院）杨汝岱、田巍、刘政文、吴群锋
（北大新结构）王歆、徐铭梽
（北大国发院）薛思帆
时间：2025年6月6日（周五）10:00-11:30
地点：北京大学经济学院302会议室
主讲人简介：
Sitian Liu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. Her research focuses on labor economics and urban economics, with an emphasis on understanding economic disparities in regional, gender, and racial contexts. Her work examines how geographic factors, public policies, and institutional environments shape individuals’ economic behavior and outcomes. Dr. Liu holds a B.S. in Economics and Mathematics from the University of Wisconsin – Madison and a Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University.
摘要：
Using a spatial equilibrium model, we show that higher local productivity enables rent-seeking governments to extract more taxes by reducing residents’ out-migration response to local tax hikes. Such rent-seeking tax policies can discourage workers from choosing high-productivity locations, reducing the national output. Guided by the model’s predictions, we provide empirical evidence of government rent-seeking, showing that tax rates and the public-private wage gap tend to be higher in more productive cities and states. To distinguish rent-seeking from alternative mechanisms, we exploit variation in public-sector collective bargaining laws across states and differences in local governments’ reliance on state transfers.
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：闻听
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
