When Shareholders Are Creditors: Effects of the Simultaneous Holding of Equity and Debt by Institutional Investors
主讲人：邵裴，CFA，加拿大北英属哥伦比亚大学（University of Northern British Columbia）金融专业副教授，加拿大约克大学金融学博士，北京大学国际经济贸易系92届学长
主 持 人：萧琛 教授
时 间：2009年5月4日 下午 2: 00—3:30
内容摘要：This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of a new and increasingly important phenomenon: the simultaneous holding of both equity and debt claims of the same company by nonblank institutional investors (“dual-holders”). The presence of dual-holders offers a unique opportunity to assess the existence and magnitude of shareholder-creditor conflicts. We find that syndicated loans with dual-holder participation have loan yield spreads that are 13 to 20 basis points lower than those without, and the difference is even larger after controlling for the selection effect. Further investigation of dual-holders’ investment horizons and changes in borrowers’ credit quality lends support to the hypothesis that incentive alignment between shareholders and creditors plays an important role in lowering loan yield spreads.