编号：E-2024-12-1
题目：Curbing Bureaucratic Information Manipulation: Evidence from a Statistical Reform in China
作者：Yongwei Nian
联系方式：Yongwei Nian, yongweinian@gmail.com
摘要：Bureaucrats are often incentivized to manipulate information, which may have real consequences. Leveraging China’s 2009 reform punishing economic data manipulation and counties’ quasi-random reform exposure, this paper provides rich causal evidence showing that the reform led to: (1) a decrease in GDP growth manipulation amounting to 5% of reported GDP growth, driven by a reputational discipline effect; (2) an increase in local officials’ development effort manifested in both policy changes and downstream impacts, consistent with an effort reallocation effect. These results thus highlight the far-reaching costs of such manipulation and the welfare implications of curbing it.
